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The ultimate goals of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) were to improve 
standards of living through intermediate targets such as ensuring higher growth in the 
economy and maintaining its stability. The conditions attached to these programmes 
were aimed at reducing inflationary pressures and improving the efficiency of 
production in the economy and its management.  These included promotion of free 
markets, tight fiscal and monetary policies, wage control, trade liberalisation, 
devaluation and privatisation amongst others. 
 
Some scholars suggest that these programmes were initially designed by the World 
Bank to complement the poverty alleviation programmes (Summer and Pritchett 1993 
and Please 1996). Others conclude that the World Bank through these programmes 
attempted to move away, to some extent though not fully, from project lending to 
policy lending in order to reduce the economic distortions present in developing 
countries which were hampering the profitability of development projects. (Kanbur 
1991).  
 
There is little controversy in the literature on the aims of structural adjustment 
programmes, however, there is no consensus on their achievements particularly in 
terms of their effects on poverty and standards of living. Some studies argued that 
conditionality has had adverse effects on standards of living in poorer countries 
(Cornia et al. 1987, Stewart 1995 and UNRISD 1995). Others suggested that high 
emphasis on structural adjustment conditions may lead to the misallocation of scarce  
resources and possibly waste of public funds (Killick, 1996). There is some evidence  
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that these programmes also affected the aid provided by donor countries. According 
to Ehrenpreis (2003) “Over the 1980s, Swedish aid in many countries was redirected 
in order to ameliorate the negative effects of structural adjustment policies (SAPs) and 
ensure that important social development programmes could be maintained.” (Page 
49).  Some scholars have gone further and regarded these programmes as highly 
inappropriate particularly for African countries and have suggested alternative 
approaches for attaining growth and stability in these countries (see for example 
Cornia and Helleiner 1994 and Engberg-Pedersen 1996). 
 
var den Hoeven (2003) argues that in most inefficient inegalitarian societies the main 
policy aims are the resumption of positive economic growth and a reduction in 
inequalities allowing for the poor to benefit from growth where precisely in these 
countries SAPs fail to come out with the intended results. Almost all the sub-Saharan 
African countries, which undertook SAPs, have had poor economic growth combined 
with a high level of income inequality and would fall into this category. 
 
Assessing the effects of SAPs is not a straightforward task. However, scholars have 
attempted to evaluate the effects of structural adjustment programmes on poverty and 
standards of living. The effects on poverty have been mainly studied through country 
case studies (see for example OECD 1992 and Stewart 1995). Cross-country studies 
have mainly concentrated on evaluating the effects of conditionality in general and on 
standards of living by taking a temporal and/or comparative approach. The basic idea 
is to compare the level of a set of socioeconomic indicators in programme countries 
during the pre-adjustment period with the same for the adjustment or post adjustment 
periods and/or compare the difference between the adjustment and pre-adjustment 
periods in programme countries with those of the non-programme countries, of 
broadly similar level, for drawing counter-factual conclusions (see for example World 
Bank 1992, Stewart 1995, Kakwani 1995 and Noorbakhsh 1999).  
 
Basically there is a broad consensus that aiming for higher economic growth in 
programme countries is good though there are some concerns on the ability of some  
countries in translating a higher rate of growth to higher standards of living (Dreze 
and Sen 1989, Noorbakhsh 1999). A recent report on chronic poverty, with reference 
to urban poverty in Ethiopia, states that improved macroeconomic management in the   3
mid-1990s did not result in a reduction in poverty, on the contrary the urban 
household welfare declined during this period (page 70, CPRS 2004).  Other studies 
go further by pointing out the inconsistency between components of SAPs and the 
longer term development policies of the programme countries. For example the public 
sector management component advocates cuts in public expenditure and often this 
takes place in terms of cuts in education, health and other pro poor social expenditures 
(Stewart 1994). It is therefore suggested that as the main aim of aid and development 
loans is improvements in standards of living in the recipient countries, the conditions 
attached to aid and loans should take these objectives into account and indeed the 
effectiveness of the related programmes should be evaluated in terms of 
improvements in standards of living (Singer 1995).  
 
The World Bank, however, maintained that conditionality has had little adverse effect 
on standards of living in programme countries (see for example World Bank 1992). 
Despite wide spread criticism of SAPs the World Bank has defended its position on a 
number of grounds of which the most logical one is that a number of countries, 
particularly in Africa, despite the conditionality imposed on their loans, did not 
comply with these conditions and in some cases they introduced other counter active 
measures or indeed reversed the reforms at a later stage. This means that a logical way 
of assessing the effect of conditionality is to differentiate between those countries 
which complied with conditionality, and those which did this partially or did not 
comply.   
 
In fact most of the earlier studies of SAPs assessed and compared the situation in the 
so-called programme countries, regardless of compliance with conditions, with those 
of the non-programme countries, again regardless of reforms in the latter countries 
which took place on their own accord and independent of the World Bank loans.  In 
brief the earlier studies concentrated on the assessment of pay off to conditional loans 
rather than pay off to actual policy reforms. Mosley, Subasat and Weeks (1995) 
suggest that it would be inappropriate to judge the effects of implementation in terms 
of recommended reforms even if these reforms are implemented. They note that a 
number of receivers of adjustment loans accepted the World Bank’s conditionality 
only to receive the loan, to be followed by either reversing the conditions or taking 
counteractive measures to neutralise them.      4
 
In brief two types of errors may be associated with the early studies of the effects of 
SAPs. First that conditions attached to SAPs were assessed regardless of being 
implemented or not. Second that the control group of countries, which were supposed 
to be non-reformers, may have adopted similar reforms on their own accord. In this 
article we attempt to correct for such errors and evaluate the effects of compliance 
with conditonality on a set of socioeconomic indicators and the composite index of 
human development. 
 
Data and methodology 
The World Bank in a report (1997) provided an assessment of the extent of 
compliance of sub-Saharan African countries with conditionality of their loans. 
Countries were assessed with respect to the full range of policy reforms in their 
programmes taking into account all policy actions taken during the programme 
including actions of reversal or counteractive nature. The result of this study was an 
index of compliance which was based on the implementation of three groups of 
measures included in conditional loans. 
 
The first group, Macroeconomic Stabilisation, included measures such as fiscal deficit 
reduction, control of public expenditure level, increase in fiscal revenues, and 
exchange rate adjustment. The second group, Public Sector Management, concerned 
measures such as civil service reforms, public expenditure reforms, public enterprise 
restructuring and privatisation. The third group, Private Sector Development, included 
measures such as financial sector reforms, trade policy reforms, pricing policies and 
incentive and improvements in regulatory environment. Countries were subsequently 
rated according to their level of compliance with each of these measures from 1 (the 
highest) to 4 (the lowest); the country’s overall index for compliance was then the 
average of the scores for these three dimensions. The final result is the classification 
of countries into groups of good, weak and poor compliers according to their 
compliance score. The classification of countries is presented in appendix 1. 
 
Noorbakhsh and Paloni (2001) and Mosley et al. (2003) discuss the problems 
associated with this index, however, they conclude that despite its shortcomings this is 
the best index of compliance available for sub-Saharan African programme countries   5
and use this index for investigating whether compliance has had any effect on growth. 
In this paper we adopt a similar approach to that of Noorbakhsh and Paloni (2001), 
though with a broader view, for assessing the effects of compliance with SAPs on a 
number of socioeconomic indicators of standards of living in sub-Saharan African 
countries.  
 
For our analysis we have selected a number of indicators. They consist of economic 
indicators reflecting broad economic aspects, which are expected to be affected by 
compliance and also social indicators, which as the literature argues, should be the 
appropriate measures for testing  the ultimate success or failure of structural 
adjustment programmes. 
 
These are real GDP per capita (GDPPC), gross domestic investment as a percentage 
of GDP (GDIGDP), annual growth rate of agricultural value added (GAGRVA), 
expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP (EUEXP), primary school 
enrolment rate (PENROL), secondary school enrolment rate (SENROL), infant 
mortality rate (IMR) and human development index (HDI). The first three indicators 
measure the per capita income and its growth and growth in investment.  Growth in 
agricultural value added has been selected as it is often argued that growth in 
agriculture has impact on poverty reduction for the poor who mostly live in rural areas 
and are active in this sector. Expenditure on education, enrolment ratios and infant 
mortality rate are to reflect the related social aspect and finally the composite measure 
of HDI has been selected to reflect the state of human development as defined by this 
index. Ideally we would have selected an indicator of poverty but this was not 
possible due to the non-availability of data in the periods required for our analysis. 
 
The period of analysis selected for this study is of special interest. While most of the 
earlier analyses used a particular date as the beginning of the adjustment period, 
which was fixed for all countries (usually 1985 or 1986), we have taken the actual 
dates of the adjustment programmes which varies for different countries. Pre-
adjustment period is defined as the five year period prior to the actual date of 
adjustment and the adjustment period is five years after the start of the programme.
1 
                                                           
1 This approach was adopted by Noorbakhsh and Paloni (2001) for studying the effect of compliance 
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In order to evaluate the medium term effects of compliance with SAPs we also have a 
second five year period after the immediate adjustment period. All indicators are 
averages for the five year pre-adjustment and for the respective adjustment periods. 
The actual pre-adjustment and the short term and medium term adjustment periods 
(Adj1 and Adj2 respectively) for all countries in the sample are in appendix 2. 
 
Compliance with conditionality and standards of living in the short run 
 
Following the approach adopted by Noorbakhsh and Paloni (2001) we start with 
employing two types of analyses: temporal and comparative temporal. In the temporal 
analysis for each indicator we look at the difference in the pre-adjustment and 
adjustment periods and test the mean of differences for these periods statistically in 
order to see if the improvement is significantly different from zero. This analysis is 
done for different groups of compliers. Two types of tests are employed: the standard 
parametric t-test and Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks test which is a non-




In the comparative temporal analysis we compare the difference between the 
adjustment and pre-adjustment periods in good and weak compliers with that of the 
poor compliers. We test the mean of difference where the group of poor compliers are 
the control group. Again two tests are employed for this purpose the standard 
parametric t-test and the Mann-Whitney U test which is a non-parametric test 
allowing for the relaxation of normality assumption in the samples, which in this case 
are independent. 
 
Table 1 shows the temporal differences and their significance for our selected 
indicators and groups of compliers. That is the difference between the first adjustment 
period (Adj1) and the pre-adjustment period for groups of good, weak, good and 
weak, and poor compliers.  
                                                           
2 Wilcoxon test is an appropriate non-parametric test as samples are related. 
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Good & Weak  Poor  Compliers/ 
Variable 
t-test         Wilcoxon  t-test         Wilcoxon  t-test         Wilcoxon  t-test         Wilcoxon 
∆GDPPC  -8.343           0.968 
(-0.89) 
-29.318        1.682    
(-1.80)
* 
-18.83          1.867    
(-2.00)
* 
-80.823       1.992
** 
(-2.07) 
∆GDIGDP  2.155            0.561 
(0.63) 
-1.816          0.357 
(-0.91) 
0.169           0.075 
(0.09) 
-1.310         0.722 
(-0.74) 
∆GAGRVA  0.822            0.561 
(0.47) 
2.020           1.172 
(1.21) 
1.421           0.859 
(1.20) 




∆EUEXP  2.086           1.572 
(1.25) 
-1.294          0.169 
(-0.90) 
0.396           1.153 
(0.35) 
-0.820          0.000 
(-0.43) 
∆PENROL  -2.528          0.533 
(-0.87) 
-3.525          0.459 
(-0.87) 
-3.053          0.161 
(-1.23) 
1.922            0.296 
(0.45) 
∆SENROL  -0.467          0.296 
(-0.58) 
-1.063          0.070 
(-0.69) 
-0.747          0.000 
(-0.91) 
0.138            0.735 
(0.07) 








-9.632           3.808
***     
(-8.12)
*** 








0.002           0.663      
(0.31) 
0.011           2.200
**     
(2.29)
** 
0.009            1.274 
(1.46) 
*** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level. 
 
For all groups of compliers ∆GDPPC shows a drop. However, the only differences in 
means significant are those of Good and Weak group of compliers (t-test at the 10% 
level) and that of Poor compliers (Wilcoxon test at the 5% level).
3 The results for 
∆GDIGDP are mixed and not significant. However, the drop in GAGRVA for the 
Poor group is highly significant according to both tests. Temporal mean differences 
for EUEXP, PENROL and SENROL are mixed and not significant for any group by 
any of the tests. The results for ∆IMR indicate that all groups, regardless of their level 
of compliance have experienced a drop in infant mortality rate and these differences 
in means are all significant. ∆HDI shows a significant temporal difference for Good, 
and Good and Weak groups.    
 
Table 2 shows the comparative temporal differences and their significance for our 
selected indicators. The control group is the group of Poor compliers. Consequently 
the results show the comparative difference in performance (as measured by the mean 
of temporal differences for each group) between other groups and the group of Poor 
compliers. Again the parametric t-test and the non-parametric Mann-Whitney tests are 
employed for the reasons mentioned above.
4 
                                                           
3 Noorbakhsh and Paloni (2001) analyse the effect of compliance on the rate of growth of real GDP 
extensively using the same data set. We have not included this indicator in our list in order to avoid  
duplication and the reader is referred to this article for details. 
4 Mann-Whitney test is a more appropriate non-parametric test in the case of comparative analysis as 
samples are independent. 
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Good & Weak  Compliers/ Variable 
t-test              MW  t-test            MW  t-test            MW   
∆GDPPC  72.480           1.30    
(1.59) 
51.505         0.56    
(1.09) 
61.992         1.11 
(1.86)
* 
∆GDIGDP  3.465             0.89 
(0.98) 
-0.506          0.29 
(-0.19) 
1.480           0.70 
(0.60) 
∆GAGRVA  2.519             1.32 
(1.50) 








∆EUEXP  2.906             1.52 
(1.09) 
-0.474          0.12 
(-0.19) 
1.216           0.98 
(0.58) 
∆PENROL  -4.450            0.09 
(-0.86) 
-5.447          0.16 
(-0.92) 
-4.975          0.05 
(-1.07) 
∆SENROL  -0.605            1.01 
(-0.32) 
-1.201          0.81 
(-0.50) 
-0.885          1.05 
(-0.51) 












∆HDI  0.013             1.25     
(1.60) 
-0.007           0.61      
(-0.76) 
0.002           0.29 
(0.22)
 
*** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level. 
 
Mean differences in ∆GDPPC between the groups in Table 2 and the Poor group are 
positive but not significantly different from zero according to both parametric and 
non-parametric tests. The only exception is that of the t-test for Good and Weak 
compliers which is significant only at the 10% level. The results for ∆GDIGDP are 
mixed and non-significant while there are significant differences for ∆GAGRVA 
indicating a higher rate of growth in agricultural value added in groups of Weak, and 
Good and Weak compliers as compared to that of the Poor compliers. Good 
compliance, however, is not associated with higher rate of growth in agricultural 
value added. The results for ∆EUEXP, ∆PENROL and ∆SENROL are not significant 
though the negative signs are notable. The differences in ∆IMR are negative and 
significant in the case of Weak group and the ∆HDI results are not significant. 
 
Overall the results of temporal and comparative tests seem to suggest that in the short-
run compliance with structural adjustment programmes may have had effects on some 
indicators of standards of living, namely, GDPPC, GAGRVA, IMR and HDI, 
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Regression analysis 
 
We extend our analysis by attempting to find out the effects of compliance on those  
indicators above, which are likely to be susceptive to compliance with SAPs. We start 
by regressing the temporal differences in variables which seem to be associated with 
compliance, namely GDPPC, GAGRVA, IMR and HDI, on the overall compliance 
scores. Table 3 depicts the results. 
 
 
Table 3. Regression of the selected dependent variables on compliance scores. 
    Dependent    Variable   































2  0.09 0.08 0.00 0.18 
F-statistics 2.68  2.29  0.00  5.19
*** 
*** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level. 
 
The regressions in table 3 do not support a link between change in GDP per capita and 
compliance. Nor do they support the proposition of a link between growth in 
agricultural value added and compliance. The same can be said for a link between the 
change in infant mortality rate and compliance. However, the coefficient of 
compliance variable in the regression for HDI is significant at the 1% level. The F-
statistics for this regression is also highly significant. The sign of compliance in this 
regression is negative, indicating that the higher the degree of compliance the higher 
the improvement in HDI.
5 That is compliance is associated with higher level of 
improvement in HDI.  
 
The above results suggest that compliance seems to be more associated with a change 
in HDI far more than with changes in other selected variables. For this reason the rest 
of this study focuses on the effects of compliance on a change in HDI. 
 
As discussed in previous sections, the literature on the effects of structural adjustment 
programmes on standards of living and poverty often quotes specific conditions being 
responsible for adverse effects such as cuts in government expenditure and the 
                                                           
5 The reader is reminded that the low (high) score for compliance indicates a high (low) degree of 
compliance.    10
vulnerability of expenditures in social sectors to such cuts. Other examples discussed 
in the literature often refer to the positive effects of financial and trade liberalisation 
on the economy, which are expected to attain higher standards of living. It therefore, 
would be interesting to see the association between the change in HDI and 
compliance with various components of SAPs.  
 
As we indicated before conditions attached to loans have been classified into three 
groups of (i) Macroeconomic Stabilisation policies (MSP), (ii) Public Sector 
Management (PSM) and (iii) Private Sector Development (PSD). Table 4 shows the 
results of regressing the temporal change in HDI on the compliance scores for these 
groups of policies. 
 
Table 4. Regression of temporal change in HDI on compliance with different components of SAPs 












































***  0.04 
*** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
Model 1 in Table 4 shows the results for regressing short run temporal change in HDI 
on all components of SAPs together. Compliance with MSP has the right sign but is 
not significant. While compliance with PSM has the right sign and is significant at the 
5% level, compliance with PSD is neither significant nor has the expected sign.  
It would be also interesting to see if compliance with the individual components 
groups of SAPs have affected short run change in HDI independently. Models 2 to 4 
show the results for these regressions. These results indicate that compliance with 
MSP have improved human development in sub-Saharan programme countries albeit 
that the coefficient is significant only at the 10% level. More specifically compliance 
with measures such as fiscal deficit reduction, increase in fiscal revenues, public 
expenditure control and devaluation has been associated with an improvement in HDI. 
   11
Compliance with PSM measures such as civil service and public expenditure reforms, 
public enterprise restructuring and privatisation seem to be highly significant in terms 
of their effects on improving HDI. However, compliance with PSD measures 
(including financial sector reforms, trade policy reforms, pricing policies) have not 
been associated significantly with changes in HDI. 
 
A number of possible criticisms may apply to our analyses so far. The temporal 
analysis has an implicit assumption that all changes that occurred in the adjustment 
period, as compared to the pre-adjustment period, are due to SAPs. This is clearly an 
unrealistic assumption, in particular when one takes into account the varying sample 
periods. The comparative analysis may also be criticised as it implies that only 
compliance would differentiate between the country groups. Clearly there may be 
other factors responsible for the perceived differences. The regression analysis is also 
limited to the compliance variables without taking into account other possible 
variables. It may well be the case that in the presence of other relevant explanatory 
variables the significance of compliance variable would simply vanish.  
 
To overcome these possible criticisms we have included a set of control variables in 
our regression for changes in HDI. A number of factors could affect the change in 
HDI. These could be the initial conditions, economic, social and also external factors. 
One suspects that the role of external factors, given our varying sample period could 
prove to be important.   
 
We have chosen four control variables to reflect these factors. The level of HDI in the 
pre adjustment period (HDIPA) was selected to reflect the initial conditions.  GDP per 
capita in the adjustment period (GDPPCAD1) and growth rate of gross domestic 
investment in the adjustment period (GGDIAD1) were included to reflect the 
economic factors influencing HDI. Tertiary enrolment in the pre adjustment period 
(TERPA) was selected to reflect the flow of highly educated human capital with 
potential future feedback to the society as well as to the future education. The external 
conditions, in the varying sample period years, were to be reflected by the growth rate 
of real world GDP in the adjustment period (WGGDPAD1).
6 
                                                           
6 Number 1 in the name of a variable indicates adjustment period 1 as described in the text. The 
relevant dates can found in Appendix 2.   12
 
Table 5 shows the results for regressing temporal change in HDI on compliance with 
conditionality in the presence of control variables. We are interested to see if the 
significance of compliance in the presence of control variables would be diminished 
or remain as before. 
 
 
Table 5. Regression of temporal change in HDI on compliance with SAPs and associated components and control 
variables 

















































































    













PSD   -0.005 
(-0.61) 
   -0.009 
(-1.40) 
N  21  21 21 21 21 
R







*** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level. 
 
The results in Table 5 support our previous results. All our models exhibit good fits as 
judged from R
2 and F-statistics. In model 1, where we use the overall compliance 
scores, the initial economic and external factors are significantly related to changes in 
HDI. The negative sign of HDIPA in the context of convergence literature, suggesting 
that the lower the initial level the higher the rate of growth, is justifiable.
7 GDP per 
capita and the world growth rate in the adjustment periods are also significant. Over 
all the empirical results seem to support the theoretical considerations for selecting the 
control variables. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
7 For a summary of the literature of convergence and its application see for example Noorbakhsh 
(2003).   13
As it can be seen from model 1 in the presence of control variables the effect of 
compliance still remains significant with the correct sign implying that compliance 
with conditionality has been associated with a higher change in HDI. Model 2 
examines the effects of complying with various components of SAPs collectively. The 
results are ambiguous and less supportive. This may be because compliance with 
various components of SAPs has produced different outcomes. For example public 
sector management measures may affect HDI positively while private sector 
development measures may have the opposite effect. It would be, therefore, 
interesting to see if compliance with different categories of SAP conditions have 
affected short run change in HDI individually. 
 
Model 3 examines the effect of MSP in the presence of our control variables. The 
same control variables are significant and the effect of complying with 
macroeconomic stabilisation policy is still significant, though at the 10% level. In this 
respect there is no change to our previous results in Table 4 for compliance with MSP. 
The effect of complying with public sector management policy conditions on ∆HDI, 
as shown in model 4, remains as highly significant as before even in the presence of 
the selected control variables.  Finally the result for model 5, related to the effect of 
compliance with private sector management policy conditions on ∆HDI, remains 
insignificant. 
 
Medium term effects of compliance 
So far we have considered the short-run effects of compliance. The World Bank often 
argues that it takes time for adjustment policies to work their way through the 
economy. While the short run effects of fiscal deficit reduction is expected to have 
adverse effects on composite measures such as HDI, the World Bank argues that in 
the medium run such effects turn to be positive through the better finances of the 
public sector. Similarly it takes some time for the public sector reforms and trade and 
financial liberalisations to generate positive effects and affect productivity in the 
economy. 
   14
 In order to investigate this we looked beyond the first 5 years of adjustment period 
and extended our analysis into the second 5 year period after adjustment. Table 6 
shows the preliminary results.  
 
Table 6. Compliance and medium term change in HDI 
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The top part of Table 6 shows the average HDI values for relevant groups and 
different periods. From an almost equal HDI in the preadjustment period various 
groups have made progress but to a different extent. During the first adjustment 
period the group of good compliers have done better than others followed by the 
group of poor compliers. What is of particular interest to us is that the group of good 
compliers have continued to increase their HDI in the second adjustment period. It is 
notable that in the second adjustment period good compliers have continued to do 
better than other groups, however, the poor compliers have done better than weak 
compliers. 
 
The fact that poor compliers have done better than weak compliers raises the question 
of: are good compliance and no compliance equally effective? For compliance to be 
effective, one would have expected the weak compliers to have done better than poor 
compliers.  
 
In addition we are interested to know if any of the mean differences are significant. 
The lower parts of Table 6 are related to the temporal changes in HDI in the medium   15
term and show the temporal and comparative temporal differences in HDI means 
between the second adjustment period (Adj2) and pre-adjustment period. Once again 
we have used t-test and Wilcoxon test for the temporal and t-test and Mann-Whitney 
test for comparative temporal differences in means for all our groups. In the 
comparative temporal comparison once again the poor group of compliers is the 
control group. 
 
As can be seen from Table 6, both parametric and non-parametric tests indicate that 
the temporal differences in means for the group of good compliers is highly 
significant. The magnitude of the difference with respect to the mean of HDI for this 
group is also high. As for the group of weak compliers, the difference is low and not 
significant. The same for the group of good and weak is also relatively high and 
significant. However, the fact that the temporal difference for the poor group of 
compliers is also relatively high and significant, albeit at the 10% level, suggests that 
the pattern may be the same for the good and poor groups; hence it seems that 
compliance does not clearly differentiate amongst these groups in terms of their HDI 
performance. The results of both parametric and non-parametric tests for comparative 
temporal differences in means at the bottom of Table 6 do not throw more light on 
this ambiguity, as none of these for our groups is significant. 
 
To investigate this further and to attend to the possible criticisms of temporal and 
comparative analyses as outlined before, we regress the medium term temporal 
change in HDI on the overall compliance scores and also on the scores for various 
components of compliance. The results are shown in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. Regression of medium term temporal change in HDI on overall compliance and its components 



















    













PSD   0.008 
(0.72) 




















**  0.01 
*** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.   16
 
Model 1 indicates that the overall compliance has a significant effect on the medium 
term temporal change in HDI. Model 2 shows no association between compliance 
with macroeconomic stabilisation policies (MSP) and a change in HDI in the medium 
term. However, compliance with public sector management policy measures (PSM) 
seems to have a positive effect on change in HDI, though significant at only the 10% 
level. The effect of private sector development (PSD) measures on change in HDI is 
insignificant. 
 
Once again it would be interesting to see if compliance with the individual component 
groups of SAPs have affected medium run change in HDI independently. Models 3 to 
5 in Table 7 show the results for these regressions. Model 3 shows no significant 
association between compliance with MSP measures and the change in HDI. Model 4 
shows a significant association between compliance with PSM measures and the 
change in HDI while compliance with PSD measures seems to have no significant 
effect on the change in HDI. 
 
As we argued before, the results in Table 7 are subject to the criticisms that change in 
HDI in the medium term is exclusively attributed to compliance with conditionality. 
To overcome this problem, as before, we introduce a set of control variables which 
explain the changes in HDI. These are the same variables as we employed before, 
except that they are now relevant to the second period of adjustment where 
appropriate.
8 Table 8 shows the results for these regressions. 
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Table 8. Regression of medium-term temporal change in HDI on overall compliance and its components with 
control variables.  





























































































    













PSD   -0.001 
(-0.07) 
   -0.004 
(-0.50) 
N  22  22 22 22 22 
R







*** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level. 
 
The results in Table 8 indicate that the effect of overall compliance on changes in 
HDI in the medium term, in the presence of control variables, vanishes (model 1). The 
same is the case for compliance with various components of conditionality, 
collectively (model 2) and separately (models 3 to 5). The selected control variables 
are by and large sensible as indicated by the results.
9 The least we could say is that 
there seems to be little to suggest that the effect of compliance with conditionality on 
HDI is persistent over time.  
 
Concluding Discussion 
Some socioeconomic aspects seem to have changed differently in countries which 
complied with SAPs. In the first instance it seems that a high degree of compliance 
with conditionality was associated with positive changes in some socioeconomic 
aspects as reflected by our selected indicators in the short run. Out of the four 
indicators, which seemingly were mostly affected by compliance, the change in HDI 
appears to stand the vigorous and stringent test of association. Categories of policy 
conditions were associated with the change in HDI in the short run differently. The   18
change in HDI was affected significantly by the public sector management policy 
measures (PSM), less significantly by the macroeconomic stabilisation policy 
measures (MSP) and not affected by the private sector development policy measures 
(PSD).  This was if we assumed that the changes in HDI were due to these measures 
only. However, when a set of relevant control variables were introduced, the effect of 
the above categories of policy measures remained more or less the same with a drop 
in the significance of MSP measures. In the light of these results it is reasonable to 
conclude that in the short run, compliance with the PSM and to some extent the MSP 
policy measures did lead to a positive improvement in HDI, while compliance with 
PSD policy measures had no effect. 
 
The mediums run effects are somewhat more ambiguous. If changes in HDI are to be 
attributed to compliance, only the effect of compliance seems to remain significant. 
However, out of the categories of policy measures, only compliance with the PSM 
measures seems to be significant. However, when control variables are introduced 
into the model, the significance of compliance with PSM measures disappears in the 
medium run. These results are in line with the outcome of a number of studies, 
including those by Paloni and Noorbakhsh (1998) on the export supply response to 
SAPs. 
 
In brief the short run effects are more pronounced than the medium run effects. 
Bearing in mind that in the case of sub-Saharan African countries conditionality was 
packaged with substantial soft loans, the remaining question is whether the short run 
significant effects are purely the effect of spending the loan money and are 
unsustainable. Indeed, Mosley et al. (2003) conclude that the size of the loan has had 
a significantly positive effect on the recipient country to comply with conditionality. 






                                                                                                                                                                      
9 We tried the same regression excluding TERAD1 and WGGDPAD2 and there were no improvements 
in the results.   19
Appendix 1. Country typology by the level of compliance 
 
Good compliers 
Benin, Gambia, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Tanzania. 
 
Weak compliers 




Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Gabon, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao 
Tome, Somalia, Sudan, Zaire. 
 
The average scores for the three components of Macroeconomic Stabilization, Public Sector 
Management and Private Sector Development constitutes the overall compliance score. The overall 
compliance scores for the good compliers range from 1.1 to 2.2 with an average of 1.7. The same for  
weak compliers range from 2.5 to 2.9 with an average of 2.7. The ratings for the poor compliers range 
from 3 to 4 with an average of 3.4. 
The data for the selected indicators were not available for all the above countries, therefore some 
countries are excluded from the relevant analysis for this reason.    20
 
Appendic 2. Actual pre adjustment, short term and medium term adjustment periods. 
 
  Pre-Adj.  Adj. 1  Adj. 2    Pre-Adj.  Adj. 1  Adj. 2 
Benin 1984-88  1989-93  1993-97  Mauritius  1976-80  1981-85  1986-90 
Burkina Faso  1986-90  1991-95  1996-2000  Mozambique  1983-87  1988-92  1993-97 
Burundi 1981-85  1986-90  1991-95  Niger  1981-85  1986-90  1991-95 
Cameroon 1984-88  1989-93  1994-98  Nigeria  1982-86  1987-91  1992-96 
CAR 1982-86  1987-91  1992-96  Rwanda  1986-90  1991-95  1996-2000 
Chad 1984-88  1989-93  1994-98  Sao  Tome  1982-86  1987-91  1992-96 
Congo 1983-87  1988-92  1993-97  Senegal  1981-85  1986-90  1991-95 
Cote d’Ivoire  1977-81  1982-86  1987-91  Sierra Leone  1987-91  1992-96  1997-2001 
Gabon 1983-87  1988-92  1993-97  Somalia  1981-85  1986-90  1991-95 
Gambia 1982-86  1987-91  1992-96  Sudan 1975-79  1980-84  1985-89 
Ghana 1978-82  1983-87  1988-92  Tanzania  1982-86  1987-91  1992-96 
Guinea- 1980-84 1985-89  1990-94 Togo  1978-82 1983-87  1988-92 
Kenya 1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  Uganda  1983-87  1988-92  1993-97 
Madagascar 1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  Zaire  1981-85  1986-90  1991-95 
Malawi 1976-80  1981-85  1986-90  Zambia  1986-90  1991-95  1996-2000 
Mali 1983-87  1988-92  1993-97  Zimbabwe  1987-91  1992-96  1997-2001 
Mauritania 1981-85  1986-90  1991-95         
   21
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